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FOREWORD
The U.S. Army has been and is struggling with
sexual harassment, assault, and rape in its ranks, but
the future can be different. In this monograph, three
seasoned officers and one cadet propose a series of
steps—based on West Point’s experiences—to “get to
the left” of these incidents by changing the cultural
structures that allow them to occur. This will only become more critical as the Army works on the policies
that will fully integrate women into the combat arms,
introducing women to sub-cultures that have, for
years, equated martial virtues with masculine ones.
Based on their experiences at West Point, they propose five “principles” and corresponding “tips” that
will allow commanders and leaders at all levels to
think about these issues in a new way. While these
principles were forged at West Point, they are applicable to leaders at all levels; inside the Army and out.
Among other recommendations they argue that leaders should “seek and break chains of circumstance”
and that “education is preferable to litigation.” Most
controversially, they argue that widespread use of
some forms of pornography in Army units can degrade culture and create the conditions for some
instances of objectification and violence; therefore,
commanders should be sensitive to striking the right
balance between unit cultures and civil liberties.
This monograph, and its focus on changing unit
cultures to prevent sexual assaults and harassment before they happen, is a breath of fresh air on a topic that
has become stale and overly-focused on hour-long
slide shows that tell Soldiers how to report incidents.
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The authors welcome your feedback on their product, and look forward to continuing to engage on
this topic.
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
On July 26, 1948, President Harry Truman signed
Executive Order 9981, which ended the practice of
segregating the military services by race. That same
year, the Army allowed women to join the services on
an equal basis with men. Both of these steps preceded
(and perhaps helped precipitate) the larger societal
changes that allowed fully equal treatment of all types
of American citizens in military service. And just over
2 years ago, Congress repealed the Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell policy, allowing for gays and lesbians to take their
place openly in the military.
West Point fully integrated women nearly 40 years
ago, with the class of 1980. Since that time, our procedures and policies for successful gender integration
have grown and evolved. While we have a long way
to go, one of the hallmarks of a profession is its continued efforts to improve. To that end, this monograph
shares a few of the lessons West Point has learned on
the prevention of sexual harassment and assault. We
share five “Principles” for leaders and commanders,
as well as associated “Tips” for implementation:
Principle 1: Leaders identify and break chains of circumstance; Principle 2: Education is preferable to litigation; Principle 3: What’s electronic is public; Principle 4: Don’t ignore pornography; and, Principle 5:
Unit climate is the commander’s responsibility. We
argue that senior commanders should hold junior
commanders responsible for their unit climates when
evidence exists that bad unit climates have led to sexual assault or harassment incidents. To that end, commanders should personally lead some of this training,
and not be afraid to treat all unit functions as opportunities to promote positive cultures.
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These principles and their associated tips are not
panaceas. However, much room exists for improvement in the Army’s programs on this topic, and we
submit our recommendations for discussion and
feedback.
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GETTING TO THE LEFT OF SHARP:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM WEST POINT’S
EFFORTS TO COMBAT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND ASSAULT
INTRODUCTION
The Army is in a unique period in its 238-year history: The end of America’s involvement in two wars,
combined with budgetary pressures that require reduction in the Army’s end-strength to a 70-year low
of perhaps 440,000 active duty soldiers has created an
environment of dramatic and rapid transition. Another of the key transitions will be the opening of combat
arms positions to women, allowing the Army and its
leaders to focus on talent at each unit level rather than
considering gender in assignment. With this change,
the Army is now an option for talented young men
and women to serve in any capacity, and the military
will better reflect society.
While the Army is currently considering how and
when to open each type of position to women, the
discussion to date has largely focused on understanding the physical standards of combat arms jobs. While
this consideration is no doubt important, we must not
forget to consider how best to ensure unit cultures
truly reflect Army values. This focus requires proactive vigilance across all Army units, not just among
combat arms units that are newly integrating women.
The removal of the combat exclusion law no longer
allows some soldiers and leaders to say that successful gender integration is someone else’s problem. The
challenge for all leaders, no matter the type of unit,
is how best to ensure every member of their organization feels value added and a contributing member
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to the team, and feels safe and secure both physically
and emotionally. Leaders in every unit and organization must establish the right learning environment
and culture to integrate fully and to capitalize on the
diverse talents within our ranks to maximize unit effectiveness. Successful integration of women into
combat arms will require the vigilant focus of leaders
and leader development institutions.
One area that will continue to be of utmost importance is the prevention of sexual harassment and assault. To get this right, the Army must first acknowledge problems, which it has to a degree. For instance,
the military acknowledges a disturbing trend of sexual assault in the ranks—some reports claim that there
were as many as 26,000 cases of “unwanted sexual
contact” in the ranks in 2013, of which about 3,000
were reported.1 Congress and the American people
are “fed up” with the ongoing issues, and the military
must continue to take its obligations seriously. This
crisis has caused the Army to focus heavily on sexual
harassment, assault, and rape prevention. This is as it
should be: Sexual assault and rape are serious crimes
that occur in our ranks far too often, victims have
been treated with disrespect and disbelief on far too
many occasions, many crimes remain unreported, and
many perpetrators go unpunished. However, waiting
until crimes have already occurred leaves the lives of
victims in shambles, forces many others to live in an
environment of fear and caution, and badly damages
the lives of the accused, whether guilty of the crime
or not. Each case of sexual harassment decreases the
effectiveness of the Army in fighting and winning
our nation’s wars, and each case of unwanted sexual
contact changes a victim’s life forever. Clearly, serious
and sustained attention to the matter is an imperative.

2

WE CAN AND MUST DO BETTER: GETTING TO
THE LEFT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT/ASSAULT
RESPONSE AND PREVENTION
We advocate a holistic approach illustrated by the
Army’s bitter experience with improvised explosive
devices (IEDs). After years of failure in preventing
IEDs, the Army turned to a new technique, colloquially known as “getting to the left of the boom.” Getting
to the left of the boom means taking away the conditions that result in the willingness of the populace
to emplace IEDs in the first place. Similarly, we as an
Army must “get to the left of Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP)” and address
the culture, language, and behaviors that are the core
of the sexual harassment and assault problem rather
than just addressing the aftereffects in the criminal
justice system.
After describing the perceived and real opportunities and problems, we offer a general framework and
principles, using West Point as our case study. For
over 200 years, West Point has provided the Army
with leaders of character and served as a kind of leadership laboratory—young leaders are encouraged to
grow and allowed to fail as a part of their growth process. Since 1976, with the entrance of the class of 1980,
women have been fully integrated into the Corps of
Cadets. Primarily for this reason, West Point can serve
as a key source of lessons learned for the rest of the
Army on issues of culture and gender integration that
arise when young men and women are put into a military environment together. Second, West Point offers a
unique perspective with its identity as both a military
and academic institution. Third, it is most closely con-
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nected to the Army in terms of its faculty, staff, and resourcing, and the superintendent, who is dual-hatted
as the president of the College, works directly for the
Army’s Chief of Staff. Finally, the strategic future of
the Army is greatly affected by the West Point Admissions Office, so it is a great case that, in reality, shapes
the Army’s future not only through the cadets but also
through its rotating military faculty who return to the
operational Army after their 2 to 3-year tour.
While the examples used in this monograph are
drawn primarily from current efforts at West Point,
the lessons learned and the theoretical framework for
addressing unit culture can be applied Army-wide
and across the Department of Defense (DoD).
CASE STUDY: WEST POINT
West Point’s struggle to deal with sexual harassment and assault in its ranks is not new: women have
been members of the Corps of Cadets since 1976.2
Unfortunately, no data are available on the rates of
sexual harassment and assault at the time. However,
it is clear that what was missing in the 1970s was open,
honest communication regarding gender relations.
The institution struggled to set the conditions such
that honest, candid communication could occur. Today, there is a danger that add-on reactive programs
to address human relations can backfire. We certainly
do not want to go “back to the future,” especially now
as we address how to implement the decision to open
all combat arms to women. Leader development primarily occurs through education and experience, and
West Point has the additional responsibility as an institution of higher learning to ensure a healthy learning environment where the free exchange of ideas is
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thoughtfully encouraged so that people learn and develop. It is this added responsibility and identity as an
institution of higher learning that provides West Point
with an opportunity to lead change in our Army, and
in this case, to lead the effort to successfully integrate
women in the combat arms.
If the Army is going to change its culture, we
will have to change behavior. And if we are going to
change behavior, we will do this through open, honest
dialog that allows introspection and reflection. One
of the key ways we learn is through communication.
Now, as the Army continues to take steps towards setting the conditions that encourage people to treat others with dignity and respect, how do we ensure that
we do not inadvertently discourage open, honest discussion—the kind of discussion that very much needs
to take place? At West Point, we noticed a potential
danger that this dialogue may not be happening because people, men and women, are afraid of being
“SHARPed.” Why? Because people, in this case, many
men, are afraid to talk, thinking that if they inadvertently say something “wrong,” they will be severely
punished. Moreover, when there is no middle ground
for discussion, women do not want to say anything,
either, due to fear of reprisals as a result of speaking
up about gender issues, sexual harassment, or assault.
In other words, people are confusing sexual assault
and other crimes that must be reported with sexual
harassment and gender issues that in many cases can
be addressed at the lowest levels. This is where introspection and learning occur—when people have a real
conversation that is essential for developing empathy
and growth.
What has complicated matters in recent years is
the emergence of social media in the midst of a sexu-
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ally-charged pop culture. Several decades ago, people
could hold a conversation without it being shared
with who knows how many people. It is hard to learn
with thousands of social media on-lookers who may
not even know the context of a conversation. People
need to learn from their mistakes—it is not the mistake per se; it is what results from it that counts. We
bring in members of the Corps from all walks of life,
from all over the country, and from all over the world.
Not everyone will come in with the same set of values. This is why the U.S. Military Academy is a leader
development institution designed to inculcate values.
To do so, we have to set conditions that encourage
frank, open discussion. How can Army leaders set
these conditions?
WEST POINT’S CADETS AGAINST
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT
Our West Point cadets launched a grass roots initiative in 2011 to tailor the SHARP program to fit the
demands and culture of the U.S. Military Academy,
called Cadets against Sexual Harassment and Assault
(CASH/A). Spearheaded by cadets, the CASH/A initiative has cadets as the primary trainers for other cadets and provides resources to the chain of command
in educating others on issues relating to sexual assault
and harassment. However, what makes CASH/A
successful compared to other programs is that it creates the middle ground by using peer-led discussion
in small groups that enables open and honest dialog,
which leads to the introspection and reflection resulting in behavior change. Today, the CASH/A program
is a formalized component of the West Point Leader
Development System, with a representative in each
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cadet company as well as CASH/A positions among
the upper levels of cadet leadership.
The reason behavior change is so important is
because our cadets and soldiers come into the Army
with a set of values that is either congruent, partially
congruent, or not at all like the values of our Army.
But our job as leaders is to transform behavior driven
initially by the values they come into the Army with,
so they are inspired to live according to the values of
the organization. That process begins with education,
but education only teaches right or wrong. It does not
enable values to be internalized. We will change our
behavior when we are inspired to live by the ethic that
inculcates our Army values. This is a transformational
process that we have to first recognize and then lead
our soldiers and cadets through. Creating the middle
ground where open and honest dialog with introspection occurs is critical to this transformation.
This program is an important step in the right direction, and it is showing encouraging signs of progress. For example, the percentage of women who said
that they had experienced sexual harassment dropped
from 60 percent in 2006 to 49 percent in 2012.3 Other
positive signs include the fact that the CASH/A program is now a formalized part of the curriculum, and
that cadets almost universally report knowing the formal definitions of sexual harassment and assault, as
well as understanding the “right way” of dealing with
issues related to those serious offenses. Finally, the
emphasis on this issue runs from the top of the chain
of command of the Army and permeates the organization; the superintendent’s (West Point’s commanding
general, a three-star position) stated #1 priority is to
eliminate sexual harassment and assault.
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Three years after the CASH/A program began in
the Corps of Cadets, we see areas of excellence and
areas for continued emphasis and improvement. We
recently held the National Conference on Ethics in
America and had small group discussion on issues of
culture and sexual assault and harassment. We are developing other forums that will create the right learning environment that fosters a positive and inclusive
climate and culture. While the CASH/A program has
begun to open the necessary dialogue, we realize that
we must remain proactive and vigilant and continually assess the program’s success. We realize that assessing a change in culture is difficult; statistics on reporting cases are an important indicator, but they do not,
by themselves, measure culture. We are reminded of
fundamental principles of leadership; culture change
requires continual personal leader engagement and
an effective learning environment.
HOW DOES ONE LEARN, AND HOW DOES
LEARNING CHANGE BEHAVIOR?
Learning is an iterative process. Kurt Lewin articulated it as being a cycle consisting of four points:
formation of abstract concepts and generalizations,
testing implications of concepts in new situations,
concrete experience, and observations and reflections
(see Figure 1).4
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Concrete
Experience
Testing implications of
concepts in new
situations

Observations and
reflections

Formation of abstract
concepts and generalizations

Figure 1. Lewin Model.
David Kolb describes learning as “the major process of human adaptation.”5 Moreover, learning
“conceived as a holistic adaptive process . . . provides conceptual bridges across life situations such as
school and work, portraying learning as a continuous,
lifelong process.”6 He differentiates between performance, learning, and development. Performance is a
short-term adaptation; learning is characterized by a
longer-term adaptation; and development results in a
life-long adaptive posture.7 While culture change requires learning so that attitudes, ideas, and behavior
align with our Army values, how does this learning
that Kolb describes result in changed behaviors or a
developmental result?
West Point’s cadet developmental model provides
further guidance. It consists of five components: readiness, meaning that cadets must be open and ready to
learn; cadets must be provided with developmental
experiences or “crucibles” that challenge a cadet’s per-
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spective; cadets must be afforded both self-reflection
and structured reflection in order to grow; the process
of synthesizing developmental experiences and reflection results in new capacities and knowledge; and
finally, time—development takes time.8
Cadets enter the Academy understanding that
sexual harassment and assault are wrong and to be
avoided, but not all cadets have thought about these
concepts in detail. For that reason, they enter the learning cycle in need of help with formulating abstract
concepts. The current program does this quite well;
by exposing cadets to the reality of sexual assault and
harassment and by teaching them the process for dealing with it after it occurs, the “abstract concepts” stage
is well-covered. Later in this monograph, we describe
how to go about creating positive concrete experiences to cement the abstract concepts stage. Positive
concrete experiences within the CASH/A program
will develop a core of knowledge that, with cadet
leaders and staff and faculty as role models and mentors, will make it possible for West Point ultimately
to change its culture to achieve the superintendent’s
goal to eliminate sexual harassment and assault. From
this framework, we offer the following principles that
extend beyond the West Point case:
FIVE PRINCIPLES FOR ENSURING
AN EFFECTIVE SHARP
Principle #1: Leaders Identify and
Break Negative Chains of Circumstance.
A key leadership principle is anticipation of future
outcomes: great leaders can “see into the future” and
anticipate what action or event is next. An important
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part of getting to the left of SHARP is recognizing the
conditions that lead to an incident and stopping the
incident well before it occurs.
The 2013 Service Academy Gender Relations
(SAGR) Focus Group Report9 provides several interesting insights into cadet behavior, among them the
fact that cadets recognize that alcohol use contributes
to incidents of unwanted sexual contact. One cadet
stated that “[seniors] take passes, and they come
back after taps [sic] and . . . alcohol most of the time
is involved [in incidents of unwanted sexual contact].”10 Another cadet pointed out that many incidents of unwanted sexual contact involve prohibited
relationships11 between upper class and freshman
(plebe) cadets.
Both the alcohol and prohibited relationship examples involve long chains of circumstance before an
incident of unwanted sexual contact occurs. Up until
the critical event occurs, many people have had an
opportunity to intervene. Figure 2 provides a visual
description of a hypothesized chain of circumstance:
note that at each stage of this chain, there are multiple
methods for breaking the chain. Principle #1, then, is
simple: all leaders (a term which includes all soldiers,
cadets, and Army civilians) must be trained to proactively observe chains of circumstance, recognize
what might happen if the chain is unbroken, and act
to break the chain.
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Figure 2. Visual Description of Hypothesized Chain
of Circumstance.
Tip: Train Soldiers on Recognition and Action.
Principle #1 argues that leaders must seek out and
break chains of circumstance. With regard to SHARP
training, one key element should be detailed, gimleteyed deconstructions of actual sexual harassment and
assault cases in order to train students to spot the
“links” in the chains and identify methods to break
them. Just as the Army uses after-action reports to
deconstruct combat failures and vehicle accidents, we
should use real sexual harassment and assault cases as
the basis for discussion and training.
Some of the most successful training uses vignette
driven scenarios. Victoria Banyard, Elizabethe Plante,
and Mary Moynihan describe their use of vignettes
in training: each of the scenarios describes a situation
in which bystander involvement may be necessary,
and then asks the respondent to identify a) how badly
the person needs help and b) what action they might
undertake (out of a list of 9 actions). One example is:
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Earlier in the evening, you saw a woman at a party
who appears to be drunk and hanging all over some
of your friends. A friend tells you she’s been taken upstairs to a bedroom, where a bunch of people are having sex with her. Your friend urges you to join them.12

While perhaps uncomfortable to discuss in professional environments, such scenarios play out with
frightening regularity on college campuses and in
barracks rooms around the country, and we should
not shy away from addressing them when constructing training. In fact, West Point’s use of commercial
vendors13 to conduct some of this training has been
effective when combined with cadet leader presence.
For this particular example regarding alcohol, West
Point is taking proactive steps to address the negative
consequences of alcohol over-use by implementing a
ride-sharing program, buddy accountability, and formal patrols by unit duty officers, cadet duty officers,
and others.
Finally, soldiers should be taught to understand
the importance of language in forming cultural norms.
Sexist terms should be eliminated, and even gendered
terms eliminated whenever possible. For example,
all soldiers should be referred to as “soldiers,” not as
“female soldiers” or “male soldiers.” Certainly, using
terms to only differentiate females from the “rest” is
a subtle form of “othering” such as referring to “female soldiers” and “soldiers.” Sexist terms should be
thought of and treated the same way that racial slurs
are treated. This process has already begun with respect to slurs regarding lesbian and gay soldiers; there
is hope for language change around gender as well.
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Principle #2: Education Is Preferable to Litigation.
One of the key complaints of cadets exposed to the
SHARP program at West Point is its seeming focus
on the punishment of criminal acts of sexual assault
and sexual harassment. In two classroom discussions
with sophomore and freshman cadets, several key insights came to light. First, to broad agreement in the
room, one cadet stated that the fear of punishment of
a SHARP violation (“getting SHARPed”) is so high
and pervasive that victims (usually women) are unwilling to say anything to stop harassment, and men
sometimes make the deliberate decision not to interact
voluntarily with woman cadets so that there can be
no possible misunderstanding. The cadet stated, “The
punishment for a violation is so great that it causes
people to hide what they really think about these issues. As a result, people’s values are hidden . . . and
the truth of gender relations never comes to light.”
These cadets groups also agreed, adamantly, with the
idea that the “goal of SHARP training is to scare, not
inform.”14
Tip: Train “Escalation of Force” in SHARP.
After 12 years of war, most Army leaders are familiar with “escalation of force” procedures in combat. Principle #2 requires that leaders understand
that similar concepts apply in SHARP. Leaders must
recognize that coarse and crude behaviors are not, in
and of themselves, actions that immediately require
punishment. Instead, soldiers must be empowered
and trained to make spot corrections on this type
of behavior.
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One way to do this training would be in the form of
lane training similar to the training practiced for other
military skills. We advocate video-based, squad or
platoon-level training, perhaps similar to the Engagement Skills Trainer used for small arms training. Each
trainee should be exposed to video re-enactments of
a variety of behaviors ranging from inappropriate to
criminal and be asked to respond. Sufficient responses
would be good enough to stop the behavior. For some
kinds of infractions, a simple spot correction might be
appropriate; others will require reporting to the chain
of command; still others may require the filing of a
criminal complaint. Teaching and training cadets and
soldiers to recognize and react appropriately to these
circumstances should and could be a part of any comprehensive program to combat sexual harassment.
Tip: Poor Training Is Worse than No Training.
Poor training is often worse than no training at all
because it creates negative feedback loops and habits
of mind and behavior that are difficult to undo. In her
recent article in Military Review, Lieutenant Colonel
Heidi Urben argues that small focus groups are superior to “3-hour PowerPoint presentations directed
by Headquarters, Department of the Army.”15 Worse
still is the fact that soldiers complete the training and
then return to their usual environments, which could
be places of vulgarity, sexist attitudes and behavior,
and other cultural problems. The formal training often
stops there, and informal “training” begins, largely
unsupervised by commanders and other responsible
trainers. The barracks environment and sometimes the
home environment may not offer the fertile ground
necessary for the positive seeds planted during formal
training to grow.
15

If soldiers have negative concrete experiences,
the process of reflection can breed cynicism and
other negative attitudes, leaving them worse than
they were before the training! On the other hand,
positive concrete experiences within the SHARP and
CASH/A programs will develop a core of knowledge
that, over a period of time, can ultimately change the
overall culture.
Tip: Training Must Include Positive, Concrete
Experiences.
Positive, concrete experiences are the key to effective training, including SHARP training. The training
cannot occur solely (or even primarily) in slide shows
or other antiseptic presentations. Instead, as Urben argues, smaller groups of cadets and soldiers interacting
in discussion-based seminars can uncover important
problems and create concrete initiatives.16 She states
that “realistic, scenario-based training that focuses
both on how to intervene and how to extract oneself
(or others) from a potentially dangerous situation, to
having candid discussions about alcohol consumption. . . .”17 cannot be overlooked in the training cycle.
Another concrete example already in use in the
United States is outlined in Rape Prevention through
Bystander Education by Victoria L. Banyard, Elizabethe
G. Plante, and Mary M. Moynihan.18 The authors argue that the most appropriate method for preventing
sexual violence is to empower bystanders to intervene, and they illustrate a concrete training program
to do so. Furthermore, their program shows excellent
results, decreasing negative attitudes toward victims
and increasing willingness to intervene in potentially
dangerous situations for months afterward.19 Com-
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manders and leaders at all levels should feel not only
welcome to attempt such innovative training, but encouraged to do so. If they do not reinforce the required
slide show-type training with positive, concrete behavioral training, they should not be surprised when
negative reinforcement takes place instead.
Principle #3: What Is Electronic Is Public.
The Internet and social media, including Facebook, Twitter, e-mail, text messages, and applications
on phones provide invaluable communication and
connectivity between people. Unfortunately, there are
drawbacks to this connectivity: on-line bullying and
anonymous comments on websites and applications
can be as damaging as face-to-face assault.
Leaders should be aware of what members of their
unit are posting online: it can be an invaluable window
into the culture of the unit. Furthermore, as endless
scandals illustrate, individuals must be prepared for
what they are watching, sending, and saying online to
be made public. Malicious hacking, Internet Protocol
address tracing, and leaking by close friends or confidants can release formerly private information, images, and behaviors into the public sphere: just as “a
weapon is always loaded,” what is electronic is public.
Tip: Pay Attention to Private Networks and Online
Behavior.
DoD policy already requires commanders to “continue to deny access to sites with prohibited content
and to prohibit users from engaging in prohibited activity via social media sites (e.g., pornography).”20 We
advocate a further step: commanders must also mini-
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mize misuse of private networks (on smart-phones, for
example) while on duty. Active monitoring, including
installation of third-party software that blocks inappropriate content, should be considered. Locationbased services that allow anonymous content should
also be blocked, if possible.21
Principle #4: Do not Ignore Pornography.
Another tough, uncomfortable issue that leaders
must address if they hope to change the culture of
their units is the use of pornography. Although pornography is both ubiquitous22 and legal, study after
study documents its clear negative effects on attitudes
and behaviors, including sexual aggression.23 Among
those who view pornography, especially rape and sadomasochistic pornography, men:
report a greater likelihood of raping, committing
sexual assault, higher rape myth acceptance, lower
willingness to intervene in a sexual assault situation,
and lower efficacy to intervene in a sexual assault
situation.24
The large body of research on pornography functions
as a teacher of, a permission-giver for, and a trigger
of many negative behaviors and attitudes that can severely damage not only the users but many others, including strangers. The damage is seen in men, women,
and children, and in both married and single adults.
It involves pathological behaviors, illegal behaviors,
and some behaviors that are both illegal and pathological. Pornography is an equal opportunity and very
lethal toxin.25

We acknowledge this is a difficult topic, which is why
it deserves a leader’s attention.
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Tip: Commanders Should Consider Designating Barracks
as Workspaces.
Certain barracks, particularly those at West Point
or in deployed environments, double as working
spaces and living spaces. At West Point, for example,
cadets have computers and desks in their rooms and
no access to a separate office space. For that reason,
commanders should consider designating those
spaces as work areas, and consider applying the same
standards to pornographic materials in those spaces
that they would in other work areas. This is clearly
a sensitive area, but ample precedent exists: General
Order #1 for deployed forces prohibits purchasing,
producing, or displaying any pornographic or sexually explicit material, including on electronic storage
devices.26
Principle #5: Unit Climate Is the Commander’s
Responsibility.
While this principle may be a statement of the obvious, it is worth explicitly stating. Unit commanders
in the Army have immense responsibility: they are
responsible for the health, welfare, training, and combat employment of their unit. Furthermore, they have
Uniform Code of Military Justice authority over their
soldiers. Colloquially, commanders are said to be responsible for everything that “does or does not happen in their units.” Given this broadly-held cultural
and legal understanding, commanders must be held
responsible for the unit climate, including the climate
of gender relations in their unit. Moreover, unit commanders must be personally engaged in SHARP training; it should not be someone else’s extra duty.
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Tip: Evaluate Commanders on Unit Climate & Hold
Them Accountable.
Given that the commander must be held accountable for all aspects of the unit culture, we suggest that
the unit commanders must be trained and expected
to personally lead anti-sexual assault and harassment
training whenever possible. There is simply no substitute for personal leadership during high-value training. Company commanders and other leaders must
be held accountable for any part of the unit climate
or unit activities that facilitate or fail to prevent sexual assault and harassment.27 Any event in which all
or a significant portion of unit members participate,
whether on or off-installation, should be treated as a
function subject to military cultural expectations. This
accountability includes activities in the barracks during off-duty hours, the social events that units plan,
and any other area in which “army life” extends.
CONCLUSION
During the next few years, units across the Army
will continue to integrate women into new positions.
At West Point, we just accepted the highest percentage of women in its history with the entering Class of
2018—21 percent. It is absolutely critical that a number of different issues inherent to this transition are
addressed; perhaps chief among them is the culture
required to ensure absolute trust among teammates,
space for dialogue, and no tolerance for intentional
and vicious sexual harassment and certainly none
for assault. In short, leaders need to get to the Left
of SHARP.
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We at West Point, and commanders and leaders in
the larger Army, must set the conditions within our
units where every one of our soldiers or cadets feel
value added, are treated with dignity and respect, and
are secure both physically and emotionally. Our leaders and commanders must continue to be open and
honest about which efforts are successful and which
are not as we attempt to eliminate sexual harassment
and assault. Our current program, while very good in
some respects, will benefit from continued maturation.
Our goal is not simply to stamp out instances of sexual harassment and assault, but to make fundamental
cultural changes which will result in sexual harassment and assault being foreign to the experience of
the average cadet. Using another analogy, we seek to
alter the DNA of our unit, changing the culture so that
each soldier or cadet is able to act as an antibody to the
infection of sexual harassment and assault.
As we continue to improve our programs at West
Point, we humbly offer lessons learned to the larger
Army about our experiences thus far.
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